Akrasia in Greek Philosophy. From Socrates to Plotinus

Discussions on akrasia (lack of keep an eye on, or weak spot of will) in Greek philosophy were particularily bright and extreme for the earlier twenty years. regular tales that provided Socrates because the thinker who easily denied the phenomenon, and Plato and Aristotle as rehabilitating it straightforwardly opposed to Socrates, were challenged in lots of other ways. development on these demanding situations, this collective offers new, and in certain cases adversarial methods of studying famous in addition to extra ignored texts. Its thirteen contributions, written by means of specialists within the box, conceal the total historical past of Greek ethics, from Socrates to Plotinus, via Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Epictetus).

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N. 8 above): ‘Therefore, let no one catch us unprepared or disturb us by claiming that no one has an appetite for drink but rather good drink, nor food but good food, on the grounds that everyone after all has appetite for [‘desires’: epithumei ] good things, so that if thirst is an appetite, it will be an appetite for good drink . ’ (Socrates at 438a1–5, in the Grube/Reeve translation (Cooper, 1997)). ) Reeve, Penner, Irwin and Nicholas White propose—imply ‘a denial of the Socratic view that all desire for the good, or at least the perceived good’, because it still allows that ‘to desire something includes viewing it as good’ (Hoffman (2003), 172–3), clearly fails if ‘the Socratic view’ is actually that all desire is for the [real] good, as Penner and I take to be shown beyond doubt by the Lysis.

So goes Socrates’ explanation of why hoi polloi are mistaken and why there really is no such thing as akrasia, recognizing what is better for one and yet doing what is worse. It seems clear in the Protagoras discussion that by the ‘power of appearance’ Socrates means the power of something that merely appears to be good to convince an agent that it is good. It also seems clear that 1 ᾽Εάνπερ γιγνώσκῃ τις τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ὥστε ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα πράττειν ἢ ἃν ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

Brickhouse and nicholas d. smith can make these judgments unfailingly, even in the face of the clearest appearance to the contrary, and who can give the correct account of why she judges as she does, possesses the metrêtikê technê. Thus, we are not denying that, for Socrates, the knower must distinguish the greater good from what merely appears to be the greater good. So, in claiming that the metrêtikê technê requires weak nonrational desire, we are not suggesting that moral knowledge somehow prevents its possessor from even experiencing what falsely appears good—an appearance moral knowledge must then correct.

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